Subject: SIT-Rep 01-05-19; The US Army's Light Armored Vehicle Date: 5/19/01 3:46 PM Received: 5/19/01 4:42 PM From: ben works, BenWorks@aol.com To: ben works, BenWorks@aol.com SIRIUS: The Strategic Issues Research Institute Benjamin C. Works, Director 703 415-1191; www.siri-us.com; E-mail: Benworks@AOL.Com --Speak the Truth and Shame the Devil-- A formatted report may be viewed at: http://www.siri-us.com/issues.html To "unsubscribe" e-mail a terse message to benworks@aol.com May 19, 2001 RE: LAV-III Suitability For Air Transport in C-130s; Suitability in the Mission Spectrum Summary SIRIUS was asked by certain members of the Army and National Guard airborne and mechanized user-communities to investigate the capabilities of the Army's proposed Light Armor Vehicle (LAV) family of wheeled armored cars. In particular, we were asked to determine whether they could met an Army requirement that they be capable of combat air transport in the C-130 Hercules aircraft. SIRIUS finds that they do not meet that central requirement. Further, we find an "all wheels," single platform solution to force-mix and "mission spectrum" design, artificially constraining and inadequate. In short, the GM-GDLS LAV-III ICV infantry carrier vehicle and MGS (105mm) medium gun vehicle are both too tall and too wide for the C-130, even before you add applique reactive armor that provides protection against rocket propelled grenades and 20 mm machine gun rounds. The MGS is also too heavy. The mission spectrum argues for a mix of tracked and wheeled units, to mechanize our light forces. Even if the LAV-III met the air transportability requirement, it would not be suitable for the broadest range in that mission spectrum. It would be adequate only in the lowest end of low-intensity conflicts, for "deep reconnaissance," and in peacekeeping garrisons, which should be tailored around military police and "constabulary" forces with a broader range of specialties than found in an infantry brigade. Background and Analysis: The US Army wants to buy some 2130 8-wheeled Light Armored Vehicles for about $4 billion. The Army put on a little show for Congress this week to support that choice; which SIRIUS believes to be a bad one. On May 18, Col. Carl F Bernard (USA-Ret.) and I visited the Andrews Air Force Base Air Show to investigate the LAV, the C-130 and related matters. I took my trusty Stanley measuring tape, note pad and pen. Together, we took our critical faculties. Carl was pressed for time but we managed to get the story in about 90 minutes, including a literature grab from GM-General Dynamics Land Systems for the "techno-porn" statistical fact sheets on the ICV and MGS variants. Later, visiting their website, www.gdls.com, there was nothing much of interest there --no web page with the techno-porn mirroring the brochure pages at the Army's static display. Carl and I started with a brief sideshow at the EC-130E Commando Solo JSOC broadcasting aircraft, with its interesting tail antennas --who could resist? We then skipped the C-17 but talked to load masters for the C-5A and C-130E. The C-130 load master demonstrated that the practical width for rapid loading and unloading in combat situations is 100 inches and the practical height is 100 inches because of the angle of the exit ramp. He underscored "high bumper" designs on air-transported vehicles as a feature required for loading and unloading on air transport ramps. He showed us the two "treadways" for left and right wheels-tracks are 35" wide (I did not double-check with my tape --they could be 36 inches). The center section between those treadways is 30 inches, according to the load master; that equals 100 inches in practical width. Frankly there is very little space outboard of those lines for a "bulging" LAV body. I'd say the practical width is 102 inches, but no more --no "freeboard" or leeway. Later, viewing the Marine LAV, I took the tape measure out and slapped it against a tire. Deflating tires would buy you at most, 3 inches, but you would not be combat-capable. The C-5A load master thought they could haul four LAVs anywhere. We viewed the Marine Corps LAV's first, and they were demonstrating the infantry carrier and the TOW variant. Their "techno-porn" statistical storyboards showed height and width exceeded 106 inches. I talked with a Marine Sergeant, serving as the display guide, and who has experience as a user. I saw the propellers, which give them their amphibious capability, which the Army isn't buying. He had no experience of loading LAVs on C-130s, which the Marines do not need to have as a capability. "The Army didn't want them and gave them to the Marines," the demonstrator cautiously observed. "Now, they want them." He shrugged. He likes them but is not wild about them; he damned them with faint praise. Carl Bernard, as a young Lieutenant in Task Force Smith, knows about mis-matching forces and equipment, then sending detachments to contend with worst-case surprises. In July 1950 Carl survived his discovery that our 2.36-inch Bazooka missiles bounced off North Korean T-34 tanks. He and I recognize the LAV-III will not be suitable in many of its foreseen roles and missions. As I was discussing the LAV with the Marine demonstrator, Carl was fussing with the LAV door --aluminum. The Marine Sergeant said, "our real weapons are speed and our radios. We use these to scout, not to get into a fight." The Marine-version 25mm chain gun is another nice feature the Army does not seem to want. The Marine LAVs served well in the 1991 Battle of Khafji, but the Marines knew how to manage their equipment's limitations. In the final essence, unless there is a glaring technology gulf, it is the men who win wars, not their machines. But why make them have to cope unnecessarily? We ultimately found the Army's display of armored equipment, light and heavy. The Army requirement as confirmed on the GD-GDLS LAV brochures has 6 bullet points, the second of which reads: "Air transportable in combat ready configuration." We know that the Army's intent was that the selected equipment be air transportable in a C-130 Hercules. The specs show the LAV fails that test. Ipse Dixit! The relevant dimensions (exclusive of applique reactive armor) from the specifications fact sheet: MGS ICV Height: 106 inches 104 inches Width: 107 inches 107 inches Combat Weight: 41,300 lbs (20.65 tons) 38,000 lbs (19 tons) The young demonstrators in from the Ft. Lewis test brigade had barely started to know the gear. Demonstrators on the MGS knew it held 18 rounds, but did not know the muzzle velocity. I underscore this point, as these are the young enthusiasts quoted in wire service coverage of the LAV's debut. They have no experience and no perspective on alternative wheeled and tracked vehicles. Flame Suppression and Habitability: The Army LAV-III's fire suppression bottles had labels in French turned towards the passengers --these units were made in Canada. Under the contract, parts from Canada will be assembled in Michigan. I recall a few years ago that the EPA forced the Armed forces to switch from a "breathable" fire suppression chemical that was human-friendly but ozone-unfriendly. They made DoD switch to a chemical that will kill the fire but also kill the troops. Does anybody out there know the characteristics of flame suppression chemicals now in use by DoD? I don't know whether that EPA idiocy-sabotage was reversed. Carl Bernard has that instinctive dislike of aluminum armor, from experiences with the old M-113s in Vietnam. He well knows its propensity to burn. I mentioned USS Stark and recalled how aluminum superstructures of British frigates burned and burned in their Falklands war. But I mentioned the applique armor, and that commanders will know how to manage the risk. It is also possible to substitute Kevlar for some of the aluminum, without getting to pricey. That fire suppression system is very important, as well. The demonstrators think it has very fast sensor-triggers. "How you gonna breathe?" I asked. "Throw open the hatches, I guess;" an E-3 cheerfully replied. We know that ammunition designed to eat up the oxygen inside armor are intrinsic problems in all armor designs and in field fortifications. But we should look at the chemicals in use. Science knows well that volcanic effusions, not human chemical emissions, are what really effect seasonal ozone holes. Lightning repairs them. Check the chemicals. I will say that I sat down in the Abrams compartment first and it was more cramped. The LAV has much higher head clearance. At 6'2," I would bump my helmet constantly in an Abrams, only occasionally in an LAV. The Marine LAVs and the Abrams interiors were in that depressing medium green paint. The LAV III interiors were white. Much more "habitable." Pressed for time, we found a downsized version of the Osprey - a Bell-Augusta executive tilt-rotor. Its price is $10 million, for a model rated for 2 crew and 9 passengers. The version we saw had executive seating for 2+6 with a bar. They have more than 80 orders. This is the deluxe toy for New York City Tycoons who want to get out to the Hamptons fast. We briefly asked about FAA certification and the demonstrator indicated that FAA has a new category-- "vertical lift" --and that they do expect certification for the executive model. I shall only observe that commercial airline jets run about $200-300,000 per passenger seat. This one runs at $1.1 million per passenger seat. A commercialized MV-22, even if simplified to eliminate folding for stowage, will be prohibitively expensive for commercial use. The military version prices out at uncomfortably over $2.5 million per passenger seat. SIRIUS is concerned with the interests of the American citizen, taxpayer and our people in uniform. A $2 million armored car that fails to meet specifications is bad procurement and bad force configuration policy. An aerial battle taxi that costs as much as the Osprey does, and for range-speed capabilities only useful at the margin of the Marine Corps mission spectrum is not a sound investment of taxpayer money. Mission Spectrum: Carl and I have studied and discussed elements of the "mission spectrum" with Col Douglas MacGregor (USA), LTCol Ralf Zimmerman (USA-Ret.), Chuck Spinney and many others in the Armor, Airborne, Light Infantry and Marine Corps communities. Wheeled armored cars have their uses in deep reconnaissance and in "constabulary" peacekeeping scenarios. They are part of the force mix; but so, too are tracked infantry carriers and tracked light-medium tanks, such as our own M-8. As to the LAV-III, it has no river-crossing capability, whereas tracks are always built with some fording ability. Further, tracked vehicles have lower profiles with reduced vulnerability to enemy firs, as their treads allow them to sit closer to the ground. The only advantages of wheeled vehicles are that they make less noise and are faster. The Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, based selection of the LAV-III on an entirely artificial criterion of "wheels or walk." The true spectrum for choice was "who are you fighting? Tracks, wheels and/or walk." In fact, experts agree that in the foreseen "interim force" and in the eventual "future force," we should have a mix of light (less than 10 tons) and medium (10-19 ton) tracks and wheels to augment our over-heavy M1A2-M2A3 King-Tiger Panzer force. And we can have those light-medium fleets in a cost-efficient manner, as quickly as we can have the proposed fleet of overweight and under-capable LAV IIIs. Let the communities of end-users help define the equipment they need --and doctrine, and force structure-- to accomplish their missions when they "go in harm's way." No more of cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all, industrialist thinking. The worst part about the "all or nothing" decision-making to buy some 2130 LAVs in order to outfit 6 brigades of light troops and converting to medium "motorized" units is the one-size-fits-all selection of any single platform. We do not need this sort of industrial age, mass production decision. We need both wheels and tracks and can afford both, at lower cost, than this highly inefficient purchase decision. Detroit abandoned its one-size fits all mentality around 1980 (see re W Edwards Deming, below). Maybe the Army should build a couple of constabulary brigades, heavy in Military Police and mounted in armored cars. Those can be backed up with either medium or heavy mechanized (tracked) brigades, as needed, to secure order in the few peacekeeping scenarios that may be rational expressions of our defense-foreign policy. In those limited scenarios, Armored cars are useful in preserving order, as convoy escorts and to "ensure domestic tranquility" in urban settings. They are vastly more vulnerable in low intensity guerrilla war scenarios and do not provide a sufficient level of "force protection" to the troops riding in them. That risk can only be partly managed by medium tracked vehicles; with doctrine, tactics and training providing the balance of force risk management. Chasing the KLA in the mountains of Kosovo and Macedonia, with their demonstrated abilities at laying ambushes with land mines and RPG-7s, I'd prefer banging my head in an Abrams. The M-113A1 with an inexpensive upgrade of applique reactive armor can provide the interim solution for a medium tracked carrier, and does meet the size requirements of the C-130. For the future force, more modern designs, similar to those the Russians have developed for their air transportable divisions, should be pursued. The Army, while canceling the decision to equip 6 brigades with the LAV, should authorize purchase of 5-10 battalions of the M-8 medium tank, also known as the "Armored Gun System" (AGS). For armored car designs, LT Col Ralf Zimmerman thinks the German Fox 6-wheeler and a couple of other European models, including the German tracked Weasel, will be better than the LAV-III for that part of the equipment mix that should be a mix of wheeled and tracked: recon squadrons and constabulary brigades. The alternatives should be re-surveyed and thought should be given to the positive side of NATO interoperability through manufacture of good European designs; then combined US-European design of future-generation armored platforms, wheeled and tracked. Manufacturing and Excellence: I'll add this. Ford hired W Edwards Deming in 1980 to lead its manufacturing renaissance after getting its butt kicked in by Toyota, Mazda, et all --fortunately Ford owned a piece of Mazda. Deming had taught the Japanese how to manufacture as Douglas MacArthur's most successful consultant to Japan's reconstruction. Through his SQA --statistical quality assurance, Ford fought back and beat Japan. In contrast, GM's Roger Smith tried to hardwire quality through robotics; and GM only adopted Deming and SQA about 1989. Deming and Ford built excellence through re-moralizing their people. One Air-Mech advocate, in particular, believes in positive motivation, and stimulating excellence in soldiers. Deming was much the same way, and though considered a curmudgeon, did bring that out in the minority of us who knew him, those who really love what they are doing and genuinely love humanity. We find ways to stimulate and motivate others who will, at least, "dare to be pretty good." My point is that the LAV is a pre-Deming design that the post-Roger Smith GM people are still trying to peddle. I'm sure the engineering and manufacturing is improved, but the basic design is suspicious because it pre-dates 1980 and the American industrial renaissance. And it does not fit the C-130 requirement. Our European allies have developed several wheeled models and several tracked models that are easily air-transportable in the C-130 and by helicopters. They also have more modern engineering, based on Deming's SQA and SQA'a bureaucratized offspring, the ISO-9000 series standards. Conclusion: Re-Open the Question of Force Design and Equipment Selection: Gen Shinseki's decision in favor of the LAV-I