Benjamin C. Works, Executive Director
--Speak the Truth and Shame the Devil--
SIT-REP 3-8; March 8, 1999
In this Bulletin: Kosovo, Bosnia
NOTE: Not surprisingly, a second account regarding the circumstances surrounding the killing of Mr. Krsto Micic Friday night has emerged and we await a fair investigation of the matter.
Constitutionally, Rambouillet is not a bad deal, though its implementation is problematical. The fact is that Kosovo is "dysfunctional," or "bankrupt" and in need of a receivership process -a political form of what an American businessman would refer to as a "Chapter XI reorganization in bankruptcy." It is this or a violent Balkan War of Reckoning, which the Albanians will only lose and in which we will all suffer.
Americans may safely start to forget the propaganda excesses encouraged by the Clinton Administration, which now stand in the way of revealing the true state of matters on the ground. It is sufficient that the Administration has punished itself by making a difficult problem more intractable by steering an easy, politically-correct propaganda course while inflating Albanian expectations these last six years. The Clinton-Albright team is starting to reposition our awareness through articles seeded around in the Media --more on this new neo-Orwellian rewrite a little further below.
That propaganda course, by the way, was entirely built on a "Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc" argument; in Clinton-Dogpatch speech, this "false cause" fallacy in logic is "the rooster taking credit for the dawn," as SIRIUS director Dan Mahony first put it. The false cause argument is that Milosevic is the cause of all misery in former-Yugoslavia, rather than the political consequence of a long-running conspiracy against the old Yugoslav nation-state by the Croat neo-fascists and their many allies in Bosnia, Kosovo and in the expatriate communities here and around Europe.
I have included May 1998 testimony by Joseph DioGuardi in the "Dole-KLA-Kosovo" archive, as it outlines the Albanian case. It represents not lies, so much as cherry-picking facts convenient to a partisan argument --convenient truths. The Albanian case could not stand without some factual basis and Albanians did die at the hands of the police as early as the 1981 Pristina demonstrations. But as I have explored herein in recent issues, the whole other side of the story remains the more compelling case.
These misrepresentations justifying policy, coupled with excessive sanctions, have only strengthened corruption in general and the hand of the Kosovo Mafia in particular, while gutting Yugoslavia's economy and increasing Serb paranoia. Worse, since Richard Holbrooke's bullying cease-fire arrangement in October and despite the presence of OSCE monitors, the KLA killing rampage against civilians escalated, while the police were hampered from any but emergency responses. Finally, Carlos Westerdorp's recent actions in Bosnia regarding the Serb president and the status of Brcko, create credibility problems for the Rambouillet agreement and for US credibility at a still-delicate moment when Mme. Albright is attempting to reposition for the longer term diplomatic resolution.
Corruption and fiscal bankruptcy, toxic whether or not there are inter-ethnic complications, have reached the point where a Bosnian Serb Army unit was shut down about a week ago, apparently (a Serb neighbor tells me) when its officers were caught selling guns to the anti-Serb guerrillas of the KLA. This has happened before. Last night, Zbigniew Brezinski, in A CNN "The Cold War" episode on the Soviet Union's Afghanistan war, confirmed that Red Army officers were selling weapons to the CIA, shopping for arms to equip the Afghan Mujaheddin. Further, the Balkan Mafias, Muslim and Christian alike, are having a field day, while politicians complete the fiscal draining of the core economy to perpetuate their regimes and core supporters..
Another impact as the West's diplomatic "volto face" (about-face) will demonstrate, is that at the core of the KLA rampage is a wider Islamic fundamentalist jihad which will have further reason to prosecute its world-wide terror campaign against the US and other prominent non-Muslim targets (see archive file "KLA-Ideology" at the website).
Rambouillet's terms, the Independence Issue and Diplomatic Repositioning:
About independence for Kosovo, though many fret about some vague phrasing regarding an international meeting on Kosovo three years after the Rambouillet Agreement's initiation, independence can only come if all of Serbia agrees to it. The language, found in the final chapter of that agreement, is included verbatim from the full text, which is widely available on the internet:
* * * *
Chapter 8
Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses
Article I: Amendment and Comprehensive Assessment
1. Amendments to this Agreement shall be adopted by agreement of all the Parties, except as otherwise provided by Article X of Chapter 1.
2. Each Party may propose amendments at any time and will consider and consult with the other Parties with regard to proposed amendments.
3. Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.
Article II: Final Clauses
1. This Agreement is signed in the English language. After signature of this Agreement, translations will be made into Serbian, Albanian, and other languages of the national communities of Kosovo, and attached to the English text.
* * * *
In the last few days we have begun to see a change of direction in Clinton administration spin in the press. Today's Time Magazine carries one such example, where Mme. Albright and Ambassador Christopher Hill are increasingly explicit in discouraging the Kosovo Albanian dream of secession:
[·]
But no one should be surprised that Rambouillet came a cropper. NATO's fragile construct was designed to avoid answering the question at the heart of this Balkan war: Should Kosovo be an independent state? "The beauty of the interim accord is that no one has to give up their dreams," explains U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill. "We've created this gray thing that one side will call an elephant and the other will call a mouse." Trouble is, some members of the Albanian delegation saw through that and demanded a written guarantee of eventual independence. No way, said NATO. "Sure, they can ask for it," Hill adds, "but getting it is another matter. Today, the international community does not support the idea of an independent Kosovo. It's not a right they have."
Well, why not? For that matter, why not independent Kurdistan? Or Chechnya or East Timor or Quebec? Once you start tinkering with global cartography, everyone wants his say. The unintended consequences of malleable borders scare away all but the most arrogant of statesmen. Yet Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sounded ready to try it last week: "Great nations who understand the importance of sovereignty at various times cede various portions of it in order to achieve some better good for their country." --end clip--
Mme. Albright was alluding to the fact that if the Serbs throw up their hands in despair and if they chose to rid themselves of the troublesome province, they do have the option, while the Kosovo Albanians do not have a unilateral right to vote their secession.
To assert that any a local majority within political-geographical sub-unit has an intrinsic right to secede from the greater whole is a form of "reductio ad absurdam" argument. It is an assertion convenient to the micro-politics of local advantage and gains traction among policy amateurs more impressed by rhetoric than logic. But in the political world governed by traditional international law, further ratified within the Helsinki-OSCE charter, it is clear that only all the voters of the greater political unit(s) can make such a decision. On the practical side, the Albanisns flunked miserably in their first attempt at self-rule, hence the need for a stern nanny.
Stalin and Tito created an exception within their Constitutions, Stalin for propaganda purposes: the "republics" of the Soviet Union did have an explicit right of secession, Stalin's way of demonstrating that his workers' paradise was a voluntary association. Tito granted the right of secession to the republics of Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia, and later to Bosnia. He also promoted the self-government of the province of Kosovo & Metohija, with its bizarre constitutional implications on Serbia, ended by Mr. Milosevic's termination of that autonomous charter.
Tito's measures, in my estimation, were deliberate means of promoting ethnocentric selfishness (upon which socialism rests), while deliberately obstructing Serbia's natural dominance of the Yugoslav Federal Republic, of which Serbia was the physical core ("center of gravity") and the Serbs the largest, most independent-minded and self-reliant population. Then Tito set about seducing the Serbs and everybody with the politics of dependency --that socialist safety net. Having encouraged ethnic state politics, Tito in a self-contradiction, tried to socially homogenize his populations through the armed forces and university system. There are further implications but that's enough for today's purpose.
But this argument that only Kosovo's remaining residents have the legitimacy to declare the independence of their province from Yugoslavia and Serbia is the argument that French Canadians swarm into New Hampshire and vote to secede from the United States, or that Westchester County may secede from both New York and from the United States without consent of the rest of New York and the nation. .
The key to understanding Rambouillet's obstruction of secessionism lies in the reactions of informed parties to its terms. We already see the Clinton Administration repositioning itself in the Press. Here is a Serb reaction, asking for improvements ("enhancement" is the Clinton-speak phrase), and one from Adem Demaci, the chief ideologue of the KLA, demanding rejection:
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Pristina March 3, 1999
The delegation of the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs represented by Momcilo Trajkovic, the president of the Serbian Resistance Movement, Fr. Sava Janjic, Dusan Ristic and Aca Rakocevic met yesterday (March 2, 1999) with the OSCE Chairman, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek and the Chief of the OSCE-KVM Amb. William Walker.
The Serb delegation expressed its support for the peace efforts of the OSCE KVM in Kosovo and Metohija as well as the negotiating process, but it also expressed its serious concern because the final version of the Rambouillet document does not offer adequate and clear mechanisms to protect the rights of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija. The delegation proposed that within the existing document an annex might be added which would grant to the Serbian people in the province an appropriate level of self-government in the areas where they constitute a majority. With certain correction to the municipal borders, five "Swiss-like" cantons could be constituted in which the Serbs would have their local administration, police and judiciary as well as substantial institutional links with Serbia. Such a solution would grant to the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs a better perception of security and would prevent a possible mass exodus of the Serbian people from the province.
In case that international community fails to take into account basic existential needs of the Serbian population, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Resistance Movement will not be able to support an Agreement which would de facto initiate the exodus of the Serbian population and open a process of disintegration of the constitutional system of Serbia. In that case the international community would become an accomplice of the ethnic cleansing and the disintegration of a sovereign state.
The delegation underlined that the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church would have to be included in the negotiating process, either directly or indirectly, since without a full approval of the Serbian people no lasting peace agreement for the province is possible.
Mr. Vollebaek promised that the proposals of the Serb delegation will be seriously considered and in the meanwhile a group of OSCE lawyers will explain the details of the Rambouillet Agreement to the delegation. Ambassador Walker agreed that a possible exodus of the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija would represent a defeat for the policy of the international community and its peace efforts.
The Information Service of the Raska and Prizren Orthodox Diocese
decani@Eunet.yu http://www.decani.yunet.com/kip.html
Now for Adem Demaci's reaction:
Betreff: From Adem Demaçi's office
Datum: Tue, 02 Mar 1999 12:58:20 +0100
Von: "Adem Demaçi" <Demaci@albanian.com>
[·]
8. The sentence: "on the basis of the will of the people", does not mean that it refers to the people of Kosova and consequently Serbia can make speculations and cheat as it always does. Serbia can freely say that it refers to the will of the people of Serbia or "Yugoslavia", as Serbia and "Yugoslavia" are recognized as a state where the Kosovar Albanians live and realize their rights and obligations. We can have as many referendums as we want. We had one in September 1991. The point is that there is missing lack the International Community's obligation for its recognition. Due to this fact the word referendum was not mentioned thereof, because this expression includes that International Community should organize, control and guarantee its results. It is not coincidental that in the same sentence where is mentioned the expression the will of the people, is followed by the call upon the Helsinki Final Act, which the right to referendum, conditions with the fact that we would not b recognized as nation and with inalienability of the borders and territorial integrity of the state. --end clip--
Given a form of Rambouillet is accepted by both sides, can the rule of law and "free markets" be established in a corner of Yugoslavia without reform in the rest of the country? I await further developments, wondering at how we got to this sad point in the first place and aghast that it is so bad, that whether or not I support some outside occupation force and its costs to the armed forces and taxpayers of the US, a negotiated occupation-as-nanny is the price we shall have to pay for our all our leaders' mistakes. This is a reparation to pay all the much-abused people(s) of Yugoslavia.
© Copyright 1999 by Benjamin C. Works -SIRIUS www.siri-us.com