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SIT-REP 2-6; Saturday, February 6, 1999

Inside This Issue: Interesting Admissions, Omissions, and A Suggestion

Today's short report will focus on a published admission that the KLA is controlled from Albania, by political interests there; on who has been omitted from the negotiations at Rambouillet, and on a pragmatic diplomatic suggestion from Britain's Labourite diplomat emeritus, Lord David Owen.

The Admissions:

An Albanian Paper, "Koha Jone" published a report the other day, (appended below) confirming that it is the understanding in that chaotic country's capital that the KLA is not a domestic-Kosovan movement, but rather, is controlled by interests in Albania, itself. The paper is not explicit, but we already know they mean Sali Berisha, who also has great influence over Albania's 30-year old Prime Minister, promoted to that slot after a Berisha-engineered round of political chaos and crisis unseated an opposing government last fall.

This helps strip away any remaining pretense that the KLA is a patriotic liberation movement of oppressed idealists on some Jeffersonian mission. It is a vicious criminal enterprise, relying on heroin profits and other criminal activity for its funding, and engaged in a massive international conspiracy to steal approximately 4400 square miles of attractive real estate from Yugoslavia and any remaining non-Albanian landowners in the province of Kosovo-Metohija.

The murders, lawlessness and intimidation continues; the OSCE observers cannot prevent the KLA's ongoing campaign, while diplomacy handicaps the police from their legal duty to maintain law and order. Official sources report that Serb residents have been chased out of 97 villages since October in the KLA's ongoing ethnic cleansing.

You know, somebody is going to have the effrontery to nominate someone for a Nobel Peace Prize for this. I don't think it is merited, do you?

OMISSIONS:

As to the delegations at Rambouillet, the only interests in Kosovo represented at the talks in France are those of Rugova's political movement (LDK), the KLA and a couple of major splinter political groups competing with Rugova's movement.

Missing are all the ethnic minority communities of Kosovo; not just the Serbs, but the Roma ("Gypsies" who number anywhere from 150-400,000 depending on estimates) Circassians, Gorani, "Egyptians" and other groups. I see no sign, for instance, that the Albanian Catholic community is represented either. So much for Mr. Clinton's avowal of interest in fairly advancing the interests of all cultural and ethnic groups. So much for the Human Rights of any non-Muslim-Albanian in their mutual homeland.

This is an attempt to militate, through NATO threats, a very bad deal.

Note: In the Media and Administration reckoning, the Gypsies and other minorities are reckoned as "Albanians" and oppressed by the Serbs. In fact, they are all oppressed, harassed and terrorized by the KLA.

Lord Owens' Suggestion: A Land Swap?

Britain's Labourite Lord David Owen, as reported by Tom Friedman in his NY Times column today (appended), has offered a pragmatic and interesting "asset swap," Belgrade, he suggests, could negotiate to give up Kosovo land in exchange for the right to annex Serb lands in Bosnia. Lord Owen is an experienced hand in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and has some access to Prime Minister Tony Blair, so his proposal is credible.

To pragmatists, this is an alluring idea, but it also has its own built-in hazards. The benefit is that it is "symmetrical" to the facts on the ground; Serbs can hold on to land in Bosnia which has been ethnically cleansed, but cannot cleanse Albanians from Kosovo into Albania proper. It is a political deal, not constitutional.

The flaws are many. The plan does not recognize that in law both lands are rightful Serb holdings recognized under the Versailles Agreement. Legal-based precedents are vacated while other politically-manipulable precedents are established. Governments should not be involved in the dismantling of other states and governments. Further, the deal only encourages a carve-up of Macedonia and gives greater encouragement to the "Greater Albania" conspiracy dominated by the Geg drug-lords.

© Copyright 1999 by Benjamin C. Works --SIRIUS www.siri-us.com

Articles:

THE NEW YORK TIMES

February 5, 1999

FOREIGN AFFAIRS / By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

A Balkan Solution

SANDERSTOLEN, Norway -- Stop. Before we dive into sending American troops to sort out the Serbian-Albanian civil war in Kosovo, could we talk about this for a second? If ever there was a time for an honest reassessment of U.S. policy toward Bosnia and Kosovo, it's now. And what that reassessment would conclude is that we should redo the Dayton accords -- otherwise we're going to end up with U.S. troops in Bosnia and Kosovo forever, without solving either problem.

Take it from someone who knows, Lord David Owen, the former British Foreign Secretary who also served as the E.U.'s special negotiator for Bosnia, 1992-95. Lord Owen shared his innovative idea for dealing with the Bosnia-Kosovo crises at a seminar here. It goes like this:

Point 1. Let's recognize how we got ourselves tied up in knots in Bosnia. The major powers, argued Lord Owen, refused to consider any solution in Yugoslavia that involved changing international borders, for fear that such a solution would trigger an explosion of new ethnic states in the former Soviet Union. So when Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 90's into its regional statelets [sic! A bit insulting here]-- Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia -- the West insisted that these regional boundaries become the new, unchanging international boundaries. The result, in the case of Bosnia, was that a good number of Serbs, Croats and Muslims were trapped into living together, even though a significant number of them didn't want to.

Point 2. The Dayton accords tried to get around this by dividing Bosnia into semi-autonomous sub-regions -- 49 percent going to the Bosnian Serbs and 51 percent to a Muslim-Croatian Federation -- but then tying them together under a single, central government. This kept Bosnia's borders intact. But some of the people inside still hate each other, and peace can be maintained only by keeping U.S. and NATO troops there. To think that Bosnia today is a self-sustaining multi-ethnic state is pure fantasy. Still, there has been some progress. The Serbs of Bosnia are now divided; those living around Pale want absolutely nothing to do with a multi-ethnic Bosnian state, but more moderate Serbs living around Banja Luka are increasingly ready to live in Bosnia under a Muslim-led government.

Point 3. Kosovo is a province of Serbia (which is next to Bosnia) and is 94 percent Albanian. The Kosovo Albanians had autonomy inside Serbia, but in the wake of all the killings between Serbs and Kosovars, the Kosovo Albanians are now demanding independence. Said Lord Owen: "There is no way that Serb President Slobodan Milosevic will grant Kosovo independence, even if there is a referendum, and, at this stage, there is no way the Kosovars will settle for anything less. Trying to impose autonomy on Kosovo is like trying to push water uphill." But that is exactly what the peace talks this weekend in Rambouillet, France, will try to do.

Therefore, adds Lord Owen, "It's time to drop our reservations about redrawing international borders and to have a Balkan solution for a Balkan problem."

Point 4. That solution would be to acknowledge that two communities want out of the states they are now stuck in. The Pale Serbs want out of Bosnia, so they can join Serbia, and the Kosovo Albanians want out of Serbia, so they can be independent. Therefore, argues Lord Owen, "let's go to Mr. Milosevic and say, every square mile of Kosovo you are ready to give up and turn over to the Kosovar Albanians, we will give you in return the same amount of square miles around Pale, which you can then annex to Serbia."

You could solve several problems at once: With the Pale Serbs out of Bosnia (and with some pressure on the Croats there to be more supportive of the Muslim-led Government) you would greatly increase the chances that the remaining Serbs, Muslims and Croats in Bosnia could live together -- without foreign troops. Moreover, by giving Pale to Mr. Milosevic you compensate him and the Serbs for letting Kosovo go, and therefore you increase the chances that the Kosovo problem can be solved without foreign troops or endless bloodshed.

The only way U.S. and NATO troops are going to get out of the Balkans, and stay out, is if a majority of people there are living where and with whom they want. You want to keep the borders fixed? Fine. Then at least acknowledge that U.S. and NATO troops will have to sit on the factions living inside these fixed borders forever. And that's a long time.

Copyright 1999 The New York Times Company

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Translated from Albanian

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Koha Jone(Tirana) 3 February 1999

Albania's Disclosure

by Enton Abilekaj

It has been implied, but not been publicly declared, that the UCK [Kosovo Liberation Army] was under Tirana's command. But yesterday it was made clear that the UCK is not a spontaneous army or an army

commanded from Prishtina and directed by Demaci; it is, rather, a well thought out movement, with bases n the only Albanian state, and set on a clear long-term objective, which is the total independence of Kosova.

All this was unwillingly made clear by Foreign Minister Paskal Milo and the Albanian authorities, which, afraid of the anger of the Great Powers, forced the UCK to go to Rambouillet. Thus, Demaci has been put out of play. Even if he wanted to be the UCK's voice at the negotiating table, no one would have listened to what he had to say. The UCK has to find another political representative. It might be Krasniqi, its current spokesman. If not him, then the Kosovar army might well look for its representative in Tirana, which yesterday showed that it is the brain of the Albanian movement.

Yesterday's disclosure might be good, but it might also be a bad thing. The revelation that Tirana is the epicenter of the Albanian movement makes Albania an important factor for developments in the Balkans.

Albania can now boast of having control over the whole Albanian movement. The enthusiasm of the Great Powers has recently been dampened by insecurity as to who controls the UCK. But after Albania's assurances yesterday, the West has been quick to renew its warnings of NATO intervention. These warnings were rather lukewarm until yesterday morning.

On the other hand, Albania's control over the UCK has risks of its own. The Great Powers will immediately stop their support for the Albanian cause if they think Albania has lost control of the UCK. Besides, the existing ties between Tirana and the UCK might make Albania the target of a Serbian attack, which has been continuously talked about in recent weeks. The present time is very delicate, with everything hanging in the balance. Foreign policy is Albania's priority. But this policy has now been exposed by the disclosure of Tirana's colossal influence on all parties in Kosova. The history of Albania will change in a matter of weeks; no one knows whether it will be for the better or the worse. . . .