SIT-REP 6-04; Friday, June 4, 1999

NOTE: The SIRIUS website now has a search engine to help find things faster.

NOTE: In my next report, I hope to take a quick look at the Kashmir skirmishing between India and Pakistan, and at the trial of Kurdish Workers Party rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan. If the bombing has stopped, perhaps I can have another crack at China and the US, as well. Then there is a little matter of what happened to the Panama Canal.

In This Issue: Stalemate and the Art of the Deal

A Paranoid Thought: An American Airlines jet crashed in Little Rock during a storm, killing nine. Now the Pentagon has mobilized several thousands of Air Force reservist pilots and maintenance crews to fly in the Yugoslav air war, putting pressure on the airlines personnel staffing levels --most reserve pilots and mechanics work for the major airlines, after all. The crash, itself, appears to be a combination of weather, pilot error and mechanical problems. Was American Airlines pushing to keep a schedule hampered by pilot and ground crew shortages? I doubt any official inquiry will touch that question unless pushed. I wonder how the other airlines are doing and hope nobody is cutting corners.

I should mention that though the air war appears to be ending in a few days, the US Air Force has not only called up those reservists, it issued a "stop-loss" order to prevent retirement of some 6,000 active duty personnel. Many of these people, after their delay is cancelled, will be heading for airline jobs and getting out of the excessive tempo of operations the Clinton Administration has forced the services to maintain all these years. Meanwhile, Navy and Marine aviation personnel may retire on schedule, getting a jump on the Air Force people retained for duty.

Stalemate and The Art of the Deal:

Yugoslavia apparently surprised Mr. Clinton and NATO by its rapid acceptance of the G-8 proposal. Yesterday, by a vote of 136-74, the Yugoslav Parliament voted to accept a 12-point proposal offered by Viktor Chernomyrdin on behalf of NATO and Russia. But the indictment of Mr. Milosevic plus suggestions that the West might make reconstruction money a tool to coerce Milosevic's delivery to The Hague, may have contributed to the success of the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin initiative --he does not face immediate trial. But NATO made other material concessions, notwithstanding its spin-control.

Yesterday: NATO was not ready to deliver detailed operational guidelines for the withdrawal of Yugoslavia's forces and their replacement by NATO troops, who will have to keep the KLA guerrillas in line. Today: NATO bombs again. Tomorrow: Bombs will continue to fall while NATO and Serb Generals will meet Saturday to plan the evacuation and NATO entry, while providing for monitoring means to verify Yugoslavia's forces are meeting the several conditions of the new accord. Thus, Mr. Clinton has the opportunity to continue to bomb Yugoslav forces while NATO staffers flesh out the details. This is a peculiar way to extend the murderous air onslaught --Yugoslavia has conceded, but we get to bomb because the NATO clerks are slow drawing up orders and plans. I think that is another foul wrinkle in a malicious display of multi-national bullying.

Further, a reader informed me, that though NATO air forces may have eased off on Belgrade, Novi Sad was whacked again this morning, right on schedule.

It seems NATO "really, really, really" needs to maintain the appearance that Yugoslavia's acquiescence is an unalloyed victory for NATO air power. But Belgrade appears to have wrested a good number of key changes since Mme Albright tried to ram the Rambouillet Treaty down Mr. Milosevic's throat. Still, as with all "deals" requiring compromise, in the first flush, every side is angry, suspicious, venting frustration, etc. Russian General Ivanov is suspicious and angry, the Albanian guerrillas and their pals in the media are angry and suspicious, Serbs are angry at both NATO and Milosevic, etc., etc. Serbs fear their people will abandon Kosovo and some Albanians fear returning.

Verification of the withdrawal will not be difficult, NATO has satellite and E-8 J-Stars' ground monitoring radar to track convoys headed north out of Kosovo. Further, the UN and OSCE could provide officials to monitor the traffic at the border crossings. The trickiest part is getting NATO forces to relieve Serb troops along the Albanian border, where the KLA, at last report, were still trying to maintain the "meat grinder" battle around Morina and Kukes. That battle, thanks to NATO air power helped create a stalemate, though the Yugoslav Army was handling the KLA reasonably well. Scattered KLA groups deeper inside Kosovo are also not that great a problem for security forces, though some report that their sniping campaign is a material problem for Yugoslavia, and possibly for NATO.

Still, Yugoslavia could not quite squash the KLA and could not inflict enough damage on NATO air forces. At the same time, NATO could not force Belgrade to capitulate. So both sides modified the terms just enough so that both can claim victory; hence nobody is satisfied with the prospective outcome.

The worst of this is that too many people have died on both sides and too much ruin has been wreaked by NATO and by forces on the ground in Kosovo --both sides. None of this would have been inflicted on the innocent if the United States and its partners had properly understood --cared to understand-- the real facts, issues and agendas of the principal parties and their constituent peoples. This tragedy remains Madeleine Albright's folly, and the work of partisan manipulators such as Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic, Joseph DioGuardi, Robert Dole and a whole lot of other un-indicted co-conspirators against Yugoslavia. This time, the sons of the Nazis did not quite win. But America, Britain and France have badly bashed a long-time ally and we have much to be ashamed of. Politics are often this cynical, but rarely this homicidal.

What are the key differences between this proposal and the one offered at the time of Rambouillet? Were they worth enduring 72 days of punitive bombing, worth the lives lost on all sides? The differences are worth more to Yugoslavia than to NATO, but there is enough in this deal for both sides to save face and to claim some victory. Neither should brag, but the Clinton Administration and Blair Government can be counted on to bray and bluster loudly. We shall have to endure the lascivious gasconades of Jamie Shea for a few more days, even weeks, but the end of his Orwellian bombast is in sight.

The KLA is the big loser in this -ss it should be. At this stage, though Yugoslavia has signed on to a plan, we have only that fraudulent signature of Hashim Thaqi from the Rambouillet Accord. Adem Demaci, Joseph DioGuardi and the KLA field commanders all publicly rejected Rambouillet in March and exhorted all Albanians to keep up the fight (See Archive "KLA-Ideology.html" for these statements). Demaci, it turned out (as Paul Watson reported in the Los Angeles Times a few days ago), never left Pristina and was never molested. So too with a few other hardy Albanian leaders. The KLA and their families may chose to return, or may opt to stay in Albania, or emigrate to the Bronx; we shall see.

On the other hand, ordinary Albanian residents --including the "illegal immigrants" deliberately stripped of their documents and expelled-- should be allowed to return safely to their homes and all communities in Kosovo are due for some humanitarian assistance. It has been reported (NY Times, NY Post) that during the organized expulsion of illegal immigrants (dating from 1945-1989), at least 350 Serbs were jailed for committing crimes of murder, arson, rape and looting. Yugoslavia will do itself a favor by demonstrating publicly that it has been assiduous in punishing all those who committed excesses.

The Deal: In "the art of the deal" diplomatists understand that both sides have to compromise, when they can, to come to terms that both sides can find political support for --both must have some means to claim victory. Otherwise, we would have to resort to "unconditional surrender," for which there was no legitimate basis in the facts of the case.

Most important, though Yugoslavia must withdraw all forces, then return "hundreds, not thousands," and though NATO will be "at the core" of the international security presence, the operation will be under the mandate of the UN Security Council, where Russia and China can serve as a break on ingenious US initiatives. Under Rambouillet, some 3500 police and soldiers were to stay for a year, then withdraw; now, all must exit, but some 2000 or so will return very quickly and remain in Kosovo --albeit under the watchful eye of the UN peacekeeping force-- without a time-limit. This argues towards maintaining respect for the sovereign rights of Yugoslavia, as well as its cultural symbols.

Article 8 also specifically recognizes "the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," though it also invokes "consideration of the Rambouillet agreement."

Another key concession appears to be that UN-NATO is granted access to Kosovo, but not the unlimited access throughout Yugoslavia that the Rambouillet agreement specified. This defect in Rambouillet was pointed out by a number of international critics with an eye for detail

Russia and other non-NATO powers may contribute forces, which is good for the US taxpayer as well as for confidence building among the many non-Albanian communities and even those Albanian loyalists who oppose the KLA. The issue of sovereignty becomes a matter, again, under the Helsinki Accord of 1975, which means that the Kosovo Albanians cannot secede without assent from Serbia.

The Fallout:

There are going to be political and factional problems; the KLA leadership will be attacking Ibrahim Rugova --hopefully not declaring a blood feud or assassinating their opponents. (An interesting Reuters piece on Albanian politics is appended to the website edition.) In Belgrade, Vuk Draskovic and other politicians are speaking out again, while my correspondents indicate anger with Milosevic, Parliament and deep suspicion of the UN being nay more effective than it was when it failed to prevent the effective ethnic cleansing of Serbs out of Eastern Slavonia, Krajina, and parts of Bosnia.

Then there is the problem of Albania itself and the question of when Yugoslavia is going to get any humanitarian relief and reconstruction funding after all the years of strangulation and weeks of bombardment. The Gegs of northern Albania have resisted a century of attempts to develop social cohesion and civilization; attempts including parliamentary democracy and a constitutional republic; monarchism, fascism, naziism, Stalinism and Maoism. Albania is still at least two generations away from from readiness for the 21st century, by optimistic estimates. Development will cost big money.

Mr. Clinton insists on placing 7500 American troops in as part of this peacemaking operation; and that is a done deal, as far as the opening moves of implementation are concerned. But Americans should consider that even if this operation is an initial success, American troops should be withdrawn and replaced by Europeans at the earliest moment possible. There are enough Europeans in uniform to police Kosovo and America's Marines and infantry are needed to be combat ready, for possible deployment elsewhere.

To me, the problem here is demobilizing the KLA, while the political conundrum lies in Clinton's anti-gun supporters accepting that Kosovo's residents definitely have not just the right, but the common law obligation and immediate need "to keep and bear arms."

I think the principle of sovereignty of nations survived this round. I damn well hope so. The Globalists of "The New World Order" showed themselves to be just as irresponsible, manipulative, reckless and homicidal as any despot in history.

© Copyright 1999 by Benjamin C. Works -- SIRIUS www.siri-us.com

Political storms ahead for postwar Kosovo

By Kurt Schork

LONDON (Reuters) - Kosovo's majority ethnic Albanians will begin scrapping among themselves to shape the province's political future the moment NATO bombs stop falling and Serb forces withdraw, diplomats and analysts said Friday.

``Recrimination between supposed patriots and traitors will be the first order of political business, which is a dead-end street that will do nothing for Kosovo,'' Baton Haxhiu, editor of Kosovo's Koha Dittore newspaper, told Reuters from Macedonia.

``Kosovo is politically bankrupt, we are starting from zero. The international community will have to take the lead in creating an open, democratic society in Kosovo because neither (Ibrahim) Rugova nor the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) can do it.''

Rugova, an apostle of non-violence, was twice elected president of the self-styled ``Republic of Kosovo.'' His Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) dominated ethnic Albanian politics for most of the 1990s.

But passive resistance gave way to armed rebellion in 1998 as KLA guerrillas rejected Rugova's philosophy and mounted widespread attacks on Yugoslav army and Serbian police units.

The KLA never won a major battle. But its attacks sparked a military response from Belgrade so disproportionate and indiscriminate that NATO began bombing 10 weeks ago.

Now that Kosovo seems set for self-rule as an autonomous province, Rugova and his LDK supporters will be pitched against KLA activists, who must disarm under the proposed peace plan, for political primacy.

The guerrillas will claim that they set in motion the chain of events that led to self-rule. Rugova may blame them, along with the Serbs, for widespread death and destruction in Kosovo.

``Most press accounts tend to portray Rugova as a thoroughly discredited figure with no political future, but I wouldn't write him off so quickly myself,'' said a Western diplomat in Skopje, Macedonia.

``The KLA will have a presence on the ground inside Kosovo when the refugees begin to go back, but they are notoriously disorganized and heavy-handed. Also, a presence is not the same as a coherent political structure, which the LDK may retain.''

Critics say that most of whatever residual support Rugova had when NATO's air war began evaporated after he went to Belgrade to meet Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.

This came amid reports that ethnic Albanians were being murdered by Serb forces and expelled in their hundreds of thousands. Rugova maintains he acted under duress because he and his family were under house arrest in Pristina, Kosovo's capital.

Almost entirely lacking in the common touch, he might have redeemed himself after escaping Kosovo by bathing in the suffering of his people in the sprawling refugee camps inside Macedonia and Albania.

Instead, he moved briefly through one camp like a visiting head of state rather than a fellow refugee.

KLA politics remain murky but the guerrilla army has shown itself to be authoritarian by reflex, raising concerns about what sort of government its commanders might envision for Kosovo now the war seems to be drawing to an end.

Hashim Thaqi, a young member of the KLA general headquarters, emerged during peace talks in Rambouillet, France in February as the leader of the ethnic Albanian delegation, overshadowing Rugova in the deliberations.

Thaqi's political ambition is obvious, diplomats agree. What he would do with power if he got it is not.

Both Rugova and the KLA have had an easy ride to date in the sense that opposition to Serb rule has been the only real plank in any ethnic Albanian platform.

Nobody seems to know what a competition of political ideas would produce in a Kosovo freed from Serb domination but still obligated to protect its Serb minority.

In the meantime the international community is poised to send in an army of bureaucrats, doctors, lawyers, planners and engineers to provide Kosovo with an interim administration until elections can be held -- probably many months from now.

That international presence should give refugees a chance to return home, find and mourn their dead and begin rebuilding before making any major political decisions.

Beyond Rugova and Thaqi there are other prominent ethnic Albanians who could emerge as leaders of the province.

One name frequently mentioned is that of Veton Surroi, the former editor of Koha Dittore, who is reported to have spent the war inside Pristina rather than fleeing to Macedonia or Albania.

The well-traveled son of a former Yugoslav diplomat, Surroi has kept his distance from both Rugova and the KLA and is well-regarded by many Western leaders.

11:12 06-04-99

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